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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900148 
v. : 
DONALD WAYNE BROWN, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Two issues are presented in this petition for 
rehearing: 
1. In rejecting the State's waiver argument, did the 
Court erroneously conclude that defendant did not know his 
appointed counsel was a part-time city prosecutor? 
2. Did the Court overlook relevant authority in 
addressing defendant's "plain error" argument which he raised for 
the first time in his reply brief, and thus improperly reach the 
"plain error" question? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Donald Wayne Brown, was charged with second 
degree murder, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-203 (1990), and two counts of aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990) (R. 2-5). 
A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder 
and one count of aggravated assault (R. 423-25). On appeal, this 
Court reversed his convictions and ordered a new trial based on 
the erroneous appointment of a part-time city prosecutor to 
represent defendant at trial. State v. Brown, No. 900148 (Utah 
Nov. 30, 1992) (a copy of the opinion is attached as Appendix A). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A statement of facts beyond that which appears in the 
Statement of the Case is not necessary for this petition. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, in reversing defendant's conviction based on the 
trial court's erroneous appointment of a part-time city 
prosecutor to represent defendant at trial, the Court rejected 
the State's argument that defendant had waived the conflict issue 
by not presenting it to the trial court. The Court rejected the 
State's waiver argument because the record did not demonstrate 
defendant knew of counsel's status as a prosecutor at the time of 
trial. However, the Court then categorically found on the same 
record that defendant did not know of counsel's status, and 
therefore defendant was not precluded from raising the conflict 
issue on appeal. 
Because the record does not reveal what defendant did 
or did not know about counsel's status, the Court should remand 
for an evidentiary hearing on this question, rather than 
reversing defendant's conviction outright. 
Second, in reviewing defendant's claim that the trial 
court erroneously admitted evidence of defendant's prior 
aggressive behavior, this Court addressed defendant's plain error 
2 
argument, which he raised for the first time in his reply brief. 
Consideration of the plain error claim under these circumstances 
is contrary to precedent and the Court's refusal to consider 
defendant's state constitutional argument on the ground that it 
was raised for the first time in his reply brief. 
The general rule is that the Court will not consider 
issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. The Court 
applied this rule when it refused to consider defendant's state 
constitutional argument. However, without explanation, the Court 
addressed defendant's plain error argument. 
Under settled law, if defendant wished to assert plain 
error, he was required to make a plain error argument in his 
opening brief. His assertion of plain error for the first time 
in his reply brief was untimely. The Court overlooked this 
settled law when it considered the plain error issue. 
Accordingly, the Court should grant rehearing, modify 
the portion of its opinion that addresses plain error to conform 
with precedent and the Court's treatment of defendant's state 
constitutional claim, and then make clear to future litigants 
that it will not consider the issue of plain error unless the 
defendant — in his or her opening brief — acknowledges waiver 
below and sets forth a plain error analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court 
has overlooked relevant facts or authority, or misapplied the 
law. See Cummins v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 
3 
624 (1913). The argument portion of this brief will demonstrate 
that the State's petition for rehearing is properly before the 
Court and should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN REJECTING THE STATE'S WAIVER ARGUMENT 
CONCERNING THE APPOINTMENT OF A PART-TIME 
CITY PROSECUTOR TO REPRESENT DEFENDANT AT 
TRIAL, THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOW OF HIS APPOINTED 
ATTORNEY'S STATUS AS A PROSECUTOR 
The Court held that the trial court committed 
reversible error when it appointed a part-time city prosecutor, 
Thomas Willmore, to represent defendant at trial. Brown, slip 
op. at 7. In doing so, the Court rejected the State's argument 
that defendant had waived this conflict challenge to Willmore by 
failing to raise it before the trial court: 
There is no evidence in the record that Brown 
knew of Willmore's status as a city 
prosecutor. Although there was some mention 
in the record of the jury voir dire that 
Willmore had prosecuted a relative of one of 
the jurors the year before, there was no 
mention that Willmore was currently a city 
prosecutor. Because Brown did not know of 
Willmore's status, he could not have raised 
the issue below. Consequently, he is not 
precluded from raising it here. 
Id. at 7 n.2 (emphasis added). 
The Court justifiably declined to accept the State's 
waiver argument where the record did not clearly establish that 
defendant knew of Willmore's status as a city prosecutor at the 
time of trial. However, the Court then categorically found on 
the same record that defendant did not know of Willmore's status. 
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Such a conclusion suffers from the same defect the State's waiver 
argument did: the record simply does not reveal what defendant 
did or did not know about Willmore's status. Indeed, Willmore's 
affidavit (attached as Appendix B), prepared for this petition, 
indicates that defendant did know of counsel's status at the time 
of trial.1 
Therefore, rather than reversing defendant's conviction 
based on the erroneous appointment of a city prosecutor to 
represent him, the Court should remand the case to the trial 
court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant 
was aware of Willmore's status. Footnote 2 of the Court's 
opinion implies that if defendant knew of Willmore's status, the 
State's waiver argument has merit.2 Thus, on remand, if the 
trial court were to find that defendant knew Willmore was a 
prosecutor, the convictions would stand. If, on the other hand, 
the court were to find that defendant did not know of counsel's 
status, a new trial would follow. See State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 
221, 227 (Utah 1989) (fashioning similar remand order). 
1
 The State does not present Willmore's affidavit in an 
effort to establish a fact, but simply to demonstrate that there 
is an important factual question for the trial court to resolve. 
2
 The State assumes that the conflict identified by the 
Court can be waived. If, however, this is an open question, the 
Court should ask the parties for supplemental briefing on the 
issue. 
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POINT II 
IN ADDRESSING DEFENDANT'S -PLAIN ERROR-
ARGUMENT, RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HIS 
REPLY BRIEF, THE COURT OVERLOOKED RELEVANT 
AUTHORITY AND IMPROPERLY REACHED THE "PLAIN 
ERROR" QUESTION 
In his opening brief, defendant argued that the trial 
court erroneously admitted evidence of defendant's prior 
aggressive behavior in violation of rules 404 and 405, Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Br. of Appellant at 24-26. The State responded 
that defendant had waived the issue by failing to assert a 
violation of rules 404 and 405 at trial. Br. of Appellee at 20-
21. In making a "straight waiver" argument, the State noted that 
M[d]efendant d[id] not assert that the Court should consider his 
argument under the plain error rule." Ld. at 21 n.10. Then, in 
his reply brief, defendant for the first time argued that the 
trial court's admission of the challenged evidence was "plain 
error under Rules 404 and 405." Reply Br. of Appellant at 17. 
At oral argument, the State urged the Court not to 
consider defendant's "plain error" argument because it had been 
raised for the first time in his reply brief.3 The State 
explained that it is often very difficult to respond at oral 
argument to a claim of plain error raised for the first time in a 
reply brief (in such circumstances the State has had no 
opportunity to respond in writing). A distinct standard, set 
3
 The State also urged the Court not to consider the state 
constitutional claim advanced by defendant on a search and 
seizure issue for the first time in his reply brief. See Brown, 
slip op. at 4 n.l. 
6 
forth in State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989), must be applied in the plain error 
context, and the analysis of the question can be quite 
complicated. 
Nevertheless, concluding that "[d]efendant in this case 
cannot assert a violation of rules 404 and 405 as a ground for 
error on appeal when he made no such assertion at trial, unless 
it was plain error," the Court addressed defendant's plain error 
claim. Brown, slip op. at 12. The Court did not mention that 
defendant raised the plain error argument for the first time in 
his reply brief, apparently overlooking the State's request at 
oral argument that it not reach the plain error issue for that 
reason. Although the Court ultimately found no plain error, its 
consideration of the question under the circumstances of this 
case creates uncertainty as to the validity of Court precedent 
and the obligations of the State in briefing a response to an 
obviously waived issue where the defendant has not asserted or 
analyzed plain error. 
This Court has made clear that issues raised for the 
first time in a reply brief generally will not be considered. 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1169 n.6 (Utah 1988) (citing 
Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 
1980)). Indeed, without citing either Von Hake or Romrell, the 
Court applied this principle in the instant case when it refused 
to consider defendant's state constitutional argument because it 
was raised for the first time in his reply brief. Brown, slip 
7 
op. at 4 n.l. The Court explained; 
If we were to review Brown's state 
constitutional analysis under those 
circumstances, he would be rewarded for his 
omission and given the opportunity to present 
an unopposed analysis. The State would be 
placed in the difficult position in future 
cases of either missing the opportunity to 
brief the state constitutional law issue or 
having to construct and then rebut the 
unbriefed issue. 
Ibid. 
The same reasoning applies to a plain error argument 
made for the first time in a defendant's reply brief in response 
to the State's waiver argument. Accordingly, if defendant wished 
to assert plain error, he was required to make a plain error 
argument in his opening brief, with the attendant concession that 
a timely objection was not made at trial. His assertion of plain 
error for the first time in his reply brief was untimely. 
In sum, the Court should decline to consider 
defendant's plain error argument for precisely the same reason it 
refused to consider his state constitutional claim. The analysis 
of the evidentiary issue properly ends with the Court's statement 
that defendant "cannot assert a violation of rules 404 and 405 as 
a ground for error on appeal when he made no such assertion at 
trial[.]M Brown, slip op. at 12. The Court should indicate that 
defendant did not assert plain error in his opening brief but 
incorrectly reserved the claim for his reply brief as rebuttal to 
the State's waiver argument. Furthermore, the Court should make 
clear to future litigants that it will not consider the issue of 
plain error unless the defendant — in his or her opening brief 
8 
— acknowledges waiver below and sets forth a plain error 
analysis under the Eldredae standard. This will eliminate the 
uncertainty, at least for the State, as to the parties' 
obligations concerning the briefing of waiver and plain error. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should grant 
rehearing and modify the portion of its opinion that addresses 
plain error to conform with precedent and the Court's treatment 
of defendant's state constitutional claim in footnote 1 of the 
opinion. Furthermore, the Court should modify its opinion to 
order, instead of outright reversal, a remand for an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether defendant knew of appointed 
counsel's status as a prosecutor. Utah R. App. P. 35(c). 
The State certifies that this petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. ±A 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^O day of December, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
JL y&.^Z^foy^^ 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (/ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Nathan Hult, Attorney fo£ Defendant, 326 North 100 
ds C^O^&ay East, Logan, Utah 84321, thi l  of December, 1992. 
Jj. ^^^^u^^y^^ 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 -
Stat .e c -f utah# 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
F I L E D 
v . November 3"'!'" Ill;,l92 
Donald Wayne Brown, 
Defendant . Geoffrey J Butler, Clerk 
First District, Box Elder County 
The Honorable Franklin L, Gunnell 
Attorneys: R. Paul Van Dam, David B. Thompson, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff 
Nathan D. Hult, Loganf for defendant 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Defendant Donald Wayne Brown and three other men 
were charged in the beating death of Miguel Ramirez at the 
Western Brine Shrimp harvesting camp. Brown appeals his 
convictions of second degree murder, a first degree felony, 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203, and aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103. We 
reverse and remand for a new trial because of defense 
counsel's conflict of interest. We also address other 
that may be relevant to the new trial. 
In October 1989, Brown and eight other employees 
were in the Western Brine Shrimp Company's camp on the 
northwestern shore of the Great Salt Lake. Brown and three 
other men were drinking in one of the four trailers located 
at the camp The four men asked Eddie Apodaca, an employee 
who resided in a different trailer, to come over. A brief 
scuffle ensued, after which Apodaca returned to his trailer. 
The four men followed Apodaca, confronted Miguel Ramirez, 
Apodaca's roommate, forced Ramirez outside, and beat him. 
Ramirez died several hours later from the injuries he 
sustained during the beating. 
The next morning, the police arrived, secured the 
premises, and conducted two warrantless searches of the 
Western Brine Shrimp trailer in which Brown resided. Brown, 
Billy Cayer, Ray Cabututan, and William Cummins were charged 
with Ramirez's death. Brown was convicted and now appeals 
his conviction. 
Among the issues Brown raised on appeal are the 
following: (1) whether the trial court properly admitted 
evidence seized without a warrant; (2) whether it was 
appropriate for a part-time city attorney to represent Brown 
as appointed counsel; (3) whether the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence of Brown's prior bad acts; (4) whether the 
evidence sufficiently supported Brown's conviction of 
aggravated assault; (5) whether the prosecutor's reference to 
Brown as a "mad dog" in closing argument was unduly 
prejudicial; (6) whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in giving an Allen-type instruction to the jury; 
and (7) whether it was appropriate for the trial court to 
assess defense costs to Brown as part of his sentence. Brown 
also raised other issues, but because we remand due to 
defense counsel's conflict of interest and because they will 
not be relevant to the new trial, we do not address them. 
WAIVER/PROCEDURAL DEFAULT STANDARD 
Defendant raises several of his issues for the first 
time on appeal. Despite his failure to preserve these issues 
below, he argues that we should reach the merits of his 
claims under a "liberty interest" exception noted by this 
court in State v. Breckenridqe, 688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983). 
In Breckenridge, the defendant raised a due process 
claim for the first time on appeal. The defendant, who 
worked at a bodyshop, was charged with arson. During a 
"confession," he stated that he had decided to dispose of a 
pile of car parts that had accumulated in the corner of the 
building by burning them with a paint gun and cutting torch. 
The fire spread out of control and damaged the building. Id. 
at 442. Without any factual basis indicating that the 
defendant intentionally damaged the building, the trial court 
accepted his plea of guilty to a charge of arson under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-102. On appeal, Breckenridge argued that 
his right to due process was violated because the court 
accepted his guilty plea "without his understanding the 
nature and elements of arson and without a showing that there 
was any factual basis upon which to base conviction of a 
crime." Breckenridge at 443. We agreed that his right to 
due process was substantially affected. Id. at 444. 
Rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides 
that we may take notice of "plain error" that affects the 
"substantial rights" of a party even though the error was not 
brought to the attention of the court. In State v. Eldredge, 
773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989), we 
described the two requirements for finding "plain error." 
First, from our review of the record we must determine that 
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it should have beei i obvious to a trial court that it was 
committing error. Second, the error must be harmful in that 
it affects the substantial rights of the accused. See id. at 
35 and cases cited therein. In Breckenridge. this court 
commented, "The general rule that constitutional issues not 
raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal is excepted to 
when a person's liberty is at stake." 688 P.2d at 443. -We 
acknowledge that this language, although only an incidental 
comment in a case with clear plain error and obvious 
constitutional ramifications, has resulted in some confusion 
regarding the waiver/procedural default rule. See State v. 
Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 802-03 (Utah 1990); State v. Harrison. 
805 P.2d 769, 779 n.13 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 
P.2d 327 (1991); State v. Hararaves, 806 P.2d 228, 231-32 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Breckenridge was a case of plain error 
in which the Eldredae standard was clearly met. We did not 
intend in Breckenridge to carve out an additional exception 
to our traditional plain error standard, and we now expressly 
disavow any implications to that effect. We therefore review 
the issues raised in this case for the first time on appeal 
using the pia in error standard. 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress 
evidence, the parties presented the following details 
surrounding the search. C)ii October 26, 1989, three officers 
of the Box Elder County Sheriff's Department responded to a 
reported assault at the Western Brine Shrimp camp. The 
officers arrived at the scene and arrested defendant, 
Cummins, Cayer, and Cabututan. All four suspects were placed 
in trailer 4 (the trailers were numerically designated for 
clarity at trial). The officers entered trailer 3, the 
trailer in which defendant and the other suspects slept, on 
several occasions. First, shortly after their arrival, the 
officers did a quick search for safety reasons to locate 
additional suspects or weapons. After this search, one 
officer propped open the door to trailer 3. Second, the 
officers entered at the arrested defendants' request to 
retrieve a pack of cigarettes. The officers could not find 
the correct brand of cigarettes and entered again when 
defendants gave more specific instructions as to the location 
of the cigarettes. The officers entered a fourth time to 
obtain medication for defendant Cayer. Officer Yeates 
testified that on these trips into the trailer, he saw a box, 
wet shoes, and a wet wrench. 
Approximately two hours after defendants were 
transported to the jail, the.officers talked to the owner 
property manager of Western Brine Shrimp by radio and 
obtained permission to search all of the trailers. Yeates 
entered trailer 3 and seized, among other things, a pink bag 
containing Brown's wet clothes. Yeates saw Brown's knife on 
3 
his bunk but did not seize it until the following day. The 
question presented is whether the seizure of these articles 
was permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution-1 
At the suppression hearing, the trial court ruled 
that the search was permissible for the following reasons: 
(1) it was incident to an arrest; (2) there were exigent 
circumstances, namely, isolation and distance, a homicide, 
possible dissipation of blood, access of other employees to 
the premises, rain and snow nearby, and a great deal of 
agitation and distress on the part of camp personnel; (3) the 
items seized were in plain view; and (4) the owner 
consented. We review the factual findings underlying the 
trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
evidence using a clearly erroneous standard. We review the 
trial court's conclusions of law based on these facts under a 
correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 
(Utah 1991). The State concedes that the search incident to 
arrest and exigent circumstances exceptions are inadequate 
and relies only on the consent and plain view exceptions as 
justifying the search. 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits all unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
1. In his opening brief, Brown stated that seizure of his 
clothes and folding knife "should have been suppressed under 
either the state or federal constitutions." The State 
correctly noted that Brown's analysis of the search and 
seizure issue proceeded under Fourth Amendment law with no 
effort to analyze the question under article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution. The State responded, therefore, by 
discussing only federal law. The State cites State v. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), aff'd, 776 P.2d 
631 (Utah 1989), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Lafferty v. 
Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), where we stated the 
general rule that "we will not engage in a state 
constitutional analysis unless an argument for different 
analyses under the state and federal constitutions is briefed." 
In his response brief, Brown obviously realized his 
failure to include a state constitutional analysis and 
asserted this entirely new argument. If we were to review 
Brown's state constitutional analysis under those circum-
stances, he would be rewarded for his omission and given the 
opportunity to present an unopposed analysis. The State would 
be placed in the difficult position in future cases of either 
missing the opportunity to brief the state constitutional law 
issue or having to construct and then rebut the unbriefed 
issue. We prefer to review state constitutional law issues 
that both parties have had an opportunity to brief. Brown was 
aware that a state constitutional law claim might be useful to 
him when filing his opening brief. Because he did not analyze 
that issue at that time, we will not review it. 
No. 900148 4 
353 (1967). Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable 
unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement. Id. at 357. Recognized exceptions 
include consent searches, Washington v. Chrisman. 455 U.S. 1 
(1982) ; searches and seizures incident to lawful arrest based 
on probable cause under exigent circumstances, Chimel v. 
California. 395 U.S. 752, reh'q denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969); 
searches and seizures made in hot pursuit, Warden v. Havden, 
387 U.S. 294 (1967); searches and seizures of contraband in 
areas lawfully accessible to the public, State v. Shreve, 667 
P.2d 590 (Utah 1983); and seizure of evidence in plain view 
after lawful intrusion, State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 
1983). 
The core inquiry i i :t a Fourth Amendment analysis is 
"whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the area searched." United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 
292, 296 (7th Cir. 1985). fl[I]t is the right of possession 
rather than the right of ownership which ordinarily 
determines who may consent to a police search of a particular 
place." 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.5(b) (2d 
ed. 1987). If a third party rather than the defendant 
consents to a search, the third party must be one who 
possesses "common authority" over the area or has some other 
"sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to 
be inspected." Id. § 8.5(c) (citing United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)). The State argues that 
the owner of the facility had common authority with defendant 
and the other residents of the camp over at least the common 
areas of trailer 3. The State bears the burden of proving 
common authority, and it must do so by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Matlock. 415 U.S. at 177, 178 n.14 ("[T]he 
controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should 
impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence."). 
Brown shared trailer 3 with two other employees of 
the camp. He slept and kept his personal belongings in 
trailer 3, Anderson, an employee of the camp, testified that 
it was common practice for the men to knock before entering 
trailers other than their own. Trailer 3 was used to store 
the ground radios and a large refrigerator that held all of 
the perishable food for the camp. Anderson testified that 
usually the men would knock and Brown or the other co-tenants 
of trailer 3 would hand the food out to them. Anderson also 
stated that the men rarely entered someone else's trailer if 
the employee residing there was away. 
The State argues that because Brown's trailer housed 
the ground radios and the camp refrigerator, that trailer was 
a "common area" over which the owner of the camp had 
authority to consent to a search, The trial court agreed 
with that analysis. In what amounted ?~ it- bindings of fact 
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and conclusions of law, the trial court rejected the notion 
that defendant was a tenant: 
I think the testimony is that people came 
and went# the[y] shared, they had company 
things stored in those areas that they 
from time to time cooked for each other* 
And I don't think that the owner can give 
as much consent as he thinks he can. And 
that is# to go to anything that's located 
on that premises, I don't share that 
view. But I do think he can give consent 
to go into the common areas of the 
trailers and other things that he owns or 
controls there. Everybody else could. 
And certainly he could as well. And he 
can give consent for others to do that in 
my judgment, which I think allows him to 
get to that point. 
The record adequately supports the conclusion that trailer 3 
had a "common area" used by all those working at the camp. In 
effect, the employer provided room and board for workers at 
the camp. The employer purchased the food for those who lived 
in the compound. Trailer 3 had a refrigerator and was the 
primary location for the storage of perishable food. Those 
who lived at the camp had the right to obtain food located in 
trailer 3, even though they lived in other trailers. The door 
to trailer 3 was never locked. Furthermore, the ground 
radios, which were critical to conducting the work of the 
camp, were stored in trailer 3 and accessible to everyone. No 
one disputes that every employee was free to enter trailer 3 
at any time to obtain food or a radio. The same access was 
clearly available to the owner of the property, who gave the 
officers permission to search trailer 3. 
It is of no consequence that employees who bunked in 
other trailers generally knocked when they wished to obtain 
food from the refrigerator. The act of knocking hardly 
delineates the constitutional limits of the right of privacy. 
Knocking prior to entry was merely a courtesy usually extended 
by those entering the trailer. 
As an owner and operator of the business, Bentzley 
had an unrestricted right of access to at least the common 
area in trailer 3, and he therefore had the right to grant the 
officers authority to enter that area. United States v. 
Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1985); Donovan v. 
A.A. Beiro Constr. Co., 746 F.2d 894, 898-900 (D.C. Cir. 
1984); State v. Kendrick, 736 P.2d 1079, 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1987). Based on that authorization, the officers7 entry into 
that area was lawful. From the common area, all the items 
seized were in plain sight. None were hidden. None were in 
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an area within the trailer in the sole possession of 
defendant, such as in a drawer, sleeping bag, container <~»~ 
footlocker. 
It is also significant that Brown and his companion 
asked the officers three times to enter the trailer to 
retrieve cigarettes and medicine from their private 
belongings. Those entries were authorized, and defendant does 
not claim otherwise. Nevertheless, even though the officers 
had defendant's consent to search only his personal belongings 
those three times, whatever expectation of privacy defendant 
had in the trailer did not extend to the common area. 
Clearly, Bentzley's consent to search extended to the common 
area, and the officers who conducted the "plain view" search 
were justified in concluding that Bentzley did have authority 
under the doctrine set out in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 
177 (1990), to consent to the search of the common area, wn 
conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that 
Bentzley had authority to consent to the search of trailer _. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S STATUS \F, PANT--TTMK CITY PROSECUTOR 
Brown contends that he was denied due process and the 
effective assistance of counsel when the court appointed 
Thomas Willmore as his trial counsel.2 Brown claims that 
Willmore's employment as a part-time prosecutor for the city 
of Tremonton3 while he was representing Brown constituted an 
inherent conflict of interest requiring reversal. Although we 
do not decide whether it is constitutionally impermissible to 
appoint a city attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities to 
represent an indigent defendant, we conclude that vital 
interests of the criminal justice system are jeopardized when 
a city prosecutor is appointed to assist in the defense of an 
accused. Consequently, we hold that as a matter of public 
policy and pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the 
courts, counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may 
not be appointed to defend indigent persons; therefore, we 
reverse defendant's conviction and order a new trial. See 
State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 458 (Utah 1989) (not!ng our 
2 The State argues that Brown waived this objection because 
he did not raise it before the trial court. There is no 
evidence in the record that Brown knew of Willmore's status as 
a city prosecutor. Although there was some mention in the 
record of the jury voir dire that Willmore had prosecuted a 
relative of one of the jurors the year before, there was no 
mention that Willmore was currently a city prosecutor. 
Because Brown did not know of Willmore#s status, he could not 
have raised the issue below. Consequently, he is not 
precluded from raising it here, 
3. Brown was tried in Brigham City, Utah. Both Brigham City 
and Tremonton are in Box Elder County. 
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inherent supervisory power); State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 
557 (Utah 1989) (same); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 499 
(Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result) (same); 
State in re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1985) 
(same). 
The Utah criminal code requires that counties, 
cities, and towns providing counsel for indigent defendants 
ff[a]ssure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the 
client," Utah Code Ann § 77-32-1(4); see also Glasser v. 
United States. 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (defendant is entitled to 
the undivided loyalty of counsel), reh'cr denied sub nom. 
Kretske v. United States & Roth v. United States, 315 U.S. 
827 (1942).4 This loyalty is compromised when an attorney 
4. The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct also address this 
issue. An underlying premise of the rules is that a client is 
entitled to the undivided loyalty of counsel. Rule 1.7 
provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a 
client if the representation of that client 
will be directly adverse to another client, 
unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not adversely 
affect the relationship with the other 
client; and 
(2) Each client consents after 
consultation. 
. . . . 
(c) A lawyer shall not simultaneously 
represent the interests of adverse parties 
in separate matters, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation of each will not be 
adversely affected; and 
(2) Each client consents after 
consultation. 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 (1992). The comments 
to this rule further state: "[A] lawyer ordinarily may not 
act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some 
other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated." 
Because these rules do not govern our decision in this 
appeal, we do not undertake an analysis under them. 
Nevertheless, we note that the rules establish the general 
impropriety of an attorney representing separate clients with 
adverse interests. In the instant case, counsel's obligations 
to represent both the State and defendant violate this 
principle. See Howerton v. State, 640 P.2d 566, 567 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1982) ("A public prosecutor has as his client the 
state. It is obvious, therefore, that he cannot appear for 
any defendant in cases in which the state is an adverse party 
(Continued on page 9.) 
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with prosecutorial responsibilities represents an indigent 
defendant. This divided loyalty is evident in several facets 
of representation. For example, city police officers are 
often primary witnesses for the prosecution. If those same 
police officers are called to testify in a case a city 
attorney is defending, the city attorney may be disinclined 
to vigorously and abrasively cross-examine these witnesses 
because such conduct might compromise cooperation in future 
prosecutions. Counsel may be similarly reluctant to strongly 
attack inappropriate police conduct. See People v. Rhodes, 
524 P.2d 363, 365 (Cal. 1974). The California Supreme Court 
has commented on the difficult situation counsel faces in 
such cases: 
In the situation confronting a city 
attorney acting as a defense counsel there 
inevitably will arise a struggle between, 
on the one hand, counsel's obligation to 
represent his client to the best of his 
ability and, on the other hand, a public 
prosecutor's natural inclination not to 
anger the very individuals whose assistance 
he relies upon in carrying out his 
prosecutorial responsibilities. Such a 
conflict of interest would operate to 
deprive a criminal defendant of the 
undivided loyalty of defense counsel to 
which he is entitled. 
Id. at 366; see also Karlin v. State. 177 N.W.2d 318, 321 
(Wis. 1970) ("[T]he temptation might well arise not to be too 
hard on a police witness who is against your client today but 
would be the star witness for your prosecution tomorrow.11). 
Similarly, counsel may hesitate to attack the 
constitutionality of laws he or she has sworn to uphold as a 
(Footnote 4 continued.) 
. . . . " ) (citing ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and 
Grievances, Formal Op. 142 (1935)). 
Additionally, the legislature has recognized the inherent 
conflict involved when a prosecutor acts as defense counsel. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1(9)(a) (Supp. 1992) provides: 
A county attorney may not: 
(a) in any manner consult, advise, 
counsel, or defend within this state 
any person charged with any crime, 
misdemeanor, or breach or any penal 
statute or ordinance[.] 
Although this statute on its face prohibits only county 
prosecutors from acting as defense counsel, it reflects 
legislative disapproval of the notion of dual representation 
generally. 
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prosecutor- See Howerton, 640 P.2d at 567. Counsel "may be 
loath to take a position as defense counsel which he would 
find embarrassing as Commonwealth's Attorney." Goodson v. 
Peyton, 351 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir. 1965). 
Furthermore, although counsel almost certainly 
intends to diligently represent the defendant's interests, it 
is impossible to determine what sort of unconscious 
influences may affect such advocacy. See People v. 
Pendleton. 367 N.E.2d 196, 200-01 (111. App. Ct. 1977) 
("[W]hen matters of judgment and trial tactics are made in 
the name of the accused by an attorney with such concurrent 
commitments, even the most loyal and resolute defense 
attorney might be unable to conclusively establish the 
propriety of his actions."), cert, denied. 435 U.S. 956 
(1978). Lawyers who simultaneously represent an indigent 
defendant and the state are bound to be influenced at some 
level by loyalties required of a state's attorney. See id. 
Such influences, whether consciously perceived or not, 
jeopardize the integrity of the criminal adjudication process. 
Finally, a defendant's interests may be compromised 
because of a natural hesitation to confide fully in a 
prosecutor. The defendant may have information regarding 
other crimes that he or she would not want a prosecutor to 
know. See Goodsen, 351 F.2d at 909. Defendants should not 
feel constrained from discussing openly all aspects of their 
cases with counsel. Instead, they should feel fully 
protected from any potential abuses of confidence. See 
People v. Shinkle. 415 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 1980). For these 
reasons, it can never be in a defendant's best interests to 
be represented by counsel with prosecutorial obligations. 
Additionally, dual representation erodes public 
confidence in the criminal justice system. To ensure faith 
in the impartiality and integrity of the justice system, the 
appearance of fairness and impartiality in the adjudication 
process must be diligently maintained. An unavoidable 
appearance of impropriety is created when a prosecutor 
assists in the defense of an accused. The public may 
perceive that a prosecutor, desiring to further his or her 
own professional career, may use connections and influence to 
obtain a favorable result for the defendant. Rhodes, 524 
P.2d at 367. Or one may infer that a prosecutor will not 
jeopardize a "law and order" reputation by utilizing vigorous 
defense tactics. 
The public may be further concerned that a 
prosecutor's vigorous defense of an accused will result in 
decreased support from law enforcement in future cases. A 
prosecutor who alienates those law enforcement agencies on 
which he or she depends for assistance in the prosecution of 
crimes may compromise his or her prosecutorial 
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responsibilities. Thus, even if an individual defendant's 
interests were not actually jeopardized in a specific case, 
the risks to the integrity of the criminal justice system 
itself militate against appointing prosecutors to represent 
indigent defendants. See id. at 366. 
Finally, avoiding criminal defense representation is 
ultimately in the best interest of prosecutors. Regardless 
of his or her diligence in the representation, the inherent 
conflicts of the situation expose counsel to charges that the 
representation was not entirely faithful. See People v. 
Stoval, 239 N.E.2d 441, 444 (111. 1968). 
Thus, it is clear that conflicts of interest inhere 
whenever a city prosecutor is appointed to represent an 
indigent defendant. Although Chief Justice Hall points out 
that Brown was charged with violations of state law, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (second degree murder), Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (aggravated assault), and his appointed counsel's 
prosecutorial responsibilities were limited to matters of 
municipal law, this distinction is immaterial to the 
disposition of this case. A city is merely an ancillary unit 
of state government. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 
392 (1970) (cities are merely "subordinate governmental 
instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the 
carrying out of state governmental functionff (citation 
omitted)). Both city and state prosecutors deal 
interchangeably with all types of law enforcement personnel. 
City police officers are often called to testify in 
prosecutions of state law. See, e.g.f People v. Washington. 
461 N.E.2d 393, 395 (111. 1984) (city police officers were 
key witnesses in defendant's trial of state violation). 
Furthermore, city prosecutors, as representatives of the 
state, share the same loyalties as state prosecutors. In 
sum, all of the considerations outlined above apply whenever 
a prosecutor is appointed to represent a defendant, 
regardless of whether the defendant is charged with a 
violation of state or municipal law. Several states have so 
held. See, e.g.. Rhodes, 524 P.2d at 365 (city attorney 
representing defendant charged with violation of state law 
disqualified); Karlin v. State, 177 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Wis. 
1970) (noting the "potential for a serious conflict when the 
legal representative of one subdivision of a state defends a 
person charged with a crime by another subdivision of the 
state"). 
Consequently, we hold that defendant/s right to the 
undivided loyalty of counsel was jeopardized. Because a 
concrete showing of prejudice would be very difficult to make 
when a prosecutor is appointed to assist in the defense of an 
accused, we conclude that it is unnecessary and ill-advised 
to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual prejudice. 
Instead, we announce a per se rule of reversal wherever such 
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dual representation is undertaken so as to prevent its 
recurrence. 
PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE 
While conducting cross-examination himself, Brown 
asked one of the State's witnesses if he had ever seen Brown 
acting in a confrontational manner. The witness responded 
that Brown had experienced "a problem with one of the 
workers." Brown was then interrupted by his attorney and 
discontinued the line of questioning. On redirect, the 
prosecutor elicited from the witness that some time prior to 
Ramirez's death, Brown was involved in an altercation with 
another employee, after which Brown commented, "I'd like to 
see [the employee] take a dip in the lake and not come back 
up." 
At trial, defense counsel objected to the 
introduction of this evidence on the ground that it was 
beyond the scope of the cross-examination. In his brief on 
appeal, defendant asserts that the evidence was improper 
under rules 404 and 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires a 
clear and definite objection at trial to preserve an 
evidentiary error for appeal. See also State v. Eldredcte, 
773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 
(1989). To preserve a particular evidentiary objection for 
appeal, a defendant must specifically state to the trial 
court the same grounds for objection presented on appeal. 
State v. Van Matre. 777 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989). Defendant 
in this case cannot assert a violation of rules 404 and 405 
as a ground for error on appeal when he made no such 
assertion at trial, unless it was plain error. To be plain 
error, however, an error must be both obvious and harmful. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35. In this case, the jury learned of 
a prior confrontation with another employee through the 
evidence Brown himself elicited. Consequently, we cannot 
conclude that admission of the evidence was either obviously 
erroneous or harmful. 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
Defendant claims that the State presented 
insufficient evidence to support his conviction of aggravated 
assault because the evidence did not establish that he 
exhibited "a show of immediate force or violence." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102(1)(b). Because similar evidence will 
likely be offered at a new trial, we address this issue. 
In reviewing a jury verdict to determine whether it 
was based on sufficient evidence, we view the evidence 
presented and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light 
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most favorable to the verdict. State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 
273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 494 U.S. 1090 (1990). 
The jury, not the appellate court, should weigh the evidence 
and assess witness credibility. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 
342, 345 (Utah 1985). Thus, we will sustain the jury's 
verdict where there is any evidence or reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from the evidence from which the jury could 
make findings of all the elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id. 
Brown was charged with aggravated assault under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103. Violating this section involves 
committing an assault, defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 
as "a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another." (Emphasis 
added.) Richard Anderson, the victim of defendant's 
aggravated assault, testified that wrier* he stepped from his 
trailer to see what was happening, the ieur men were beating 
the victim a short distance away. Defendant raised a 
crescent wrench in his hand, pulled it back, and said to 
Anderson, "Do you want some of it too?" 
Brown argues that immediacy requires close proximity 
and that he and Anderson were not close enough to make the 
act of raising the wrench a show of immediate force or 
violence* We tend to agree that proximity has some relevance 
in determining the immediacy of the threat. In this case, 
Anderson was walking out of a trailer in a remote fishing 
camp on the Great Salt Lake. Outside of his trailer, he 
observed four men beating a fellow employee. In this 
context, Brown raised a wrench and threatened Anderson. 
Although the transcript is unclear regarding the exact 
distance between Brown and Anderson, we are persuaded that in 
light of the surrounding circumstances, the jury could have 
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Brown's threat was 
accompanied by a "show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1)(b). 
PROSECUTOR'S REFERENCE TO DEFENDANT AS "MAD DOG" 
In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor, 
referring to Brown and the three other defendants, stated, 
"There isn't one of us here who knows how we would react in a 
situation like that with four mad dogs out there beating on 
someone." Defendant objected to this statement shortly after 
it was made. He argues that the prosecutor's comment 
mandates reversal of his convictions. 
As we have frequently noted, "Counsel for both sides 
have 'considerably more freedom in closing argument' and 'a 
right to discuss fully from their standpoints the evidence 
and the inferences and deductions arising therefrom.'" state 
v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. 
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Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. 
Valdez. 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973)))• Prosecutors engage 
in misconduct, however, when they assert personal knowledge 
of the facts in issue or express personal opinion in the form 
of unsworn testimony that tends to "exploit the influence of 
the prosecutor's office and undermine the objective 
detachment that should separate a lawyer from the cause being 
argued." Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1284 (citing Laffertv, 749 
P.2d at 1255; ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-5.8 
(2d ed. 1980)). 
Referring to a defendant as a "mad dog" is the type 
of personal invective that reflects a lack of objective 
detachment a prosecutor should maintain in carrying out 
prosecutorial responsibilities. It should not be part of the 
prosecutor's rhetoric on remand. However, because we reverse 
for other reasons, we do not decide if the comment was 
sufficiently egregious to warrant reversal. 
ALLEN-TYPE CHARGE TO JURY 
Although defendant did not object to the instruction 
at trial, he argues on appeal that the trial court 
erroneously gave an Allen-type instruction to the jury before 
it began its deliberations. Instructing the jury, the court 
stated: 
The Court instructs the Jury that although 
the verdict to which each Juror agrees 
must, of course, be each Juror[']s own 
conclusion, and not a mere acquiescence in 
the conclusion of fellow Jurors yet, in 
order to bring eight minds to a unanimous 
result the Jurors should examine with 
candor the questions submitted to them, 
with due regard and deference to the 
opinions of each other. A dissenting Juror 
should consider whether their [sic] state 
of mind is a reasonable one, when it makes 
no impression on the minds of so many 
Jurors equally honest, equally intelligent, 
who have heard the same evidence, with an 
equal desire to arrive at the truth, under 
the sanction of the same oath. You are not 
to give up a conscientious conclusion after 
you have reached such a conclusion finally, 
but it is your duty to confer with your 
fellow Jurors carefully and earnestly, and 
with a desire to do absolute justice both 
to the State and to the Defendant. 
An Allen charge takes its name from Allen v. United 
States. 164 U.S. 492 (1896). In Allen, the United States 
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Supreme Court approved a supplemental instruction given to a 
jury that was having difficulty arriving at a unanimous 
verdict. Id. at 501. This type of instruction has since 
been criticized as tending to pressure jurors into giving up 
their sincere convictions merely because a majority reached a 
different conclusion. See State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 
1022 n.l (Utah 1987). We acknowledge that a supplemental 
instruction has the potential to be coercive, depending on 
its content, if given to jurors who have reached an impasse. 
In this case, however, the charge was given prior to jury 
deliberations and the instruction specifically directed the 
jurors not to give up their own "conscientious conclusions." 
In this context, the inherent danger of coercion resulting 
from the instruction is dissipated, if not lost. See State 
v. Wilson, 627 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Kan. Ct. App.), aff'd and 
remanded, 634 P.2d 1078 (Kan. 1981). We reject Brown's 
assertion that this instruction "deprive[d] the Defendant of 
the benefit of the convictions of each individual juror." 
The trial court did not err in allowing this instruction. 
REIMBURSEMENT OF DEFENSE COSTS 
Finally, defendant argues that it was improper for 
the trial court, as part of his sentence, to order him to 
reimburse the county for the costs of his defense. We will 
not set aside a sentence imposed by a trial court unless the 
sentence represents an abuse of discretion, the trial court 
failed to consider all relevant factors, or the sentence 
imposed exceeded the limits prescribed by law. State v. 
Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989). Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-32a-l allows the trial court to "require a convicted 
defendant to make restitution and pay costs." Section 
77-32a-3, however, states that before including in the 
judgment a sentence that a defendant pay costs, the court 
must determine whether the defendant will be able to pay 
them. In this case, the court apparently failed to consider 
defendant's financial status before assessing defense costs. 
Accordingly, if this issue recurs on remand, we instruct the 
trial judge to consider and make findings regarding 
defendant's ability to pay any costs levied. 
The conviction is reversed, and this matter is 
remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Howe, Associate Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Chief Justice 
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STEWART, Justice: (Concurring) 
I concur in the majority opinion. I write only 
because I believe the majority ought not approve the jury 
instruction that it characterizes as an Allen charge. In my 
view, the instruction given provides too much leverage to a 
majority of jurors to exert undue pressure on the minority. 
This has the potential effect of distorting the deliberative 
process whereby jurors, through the free exchange of their 
individual views, reach a consensus through discussion, 
reason, and argument. Jury instructions should promote the 
deliberative process by encouraging the discussion of 
evidence and instructions. That process should not be 
sacrificed in the interest of reaching a quick group decision. 
I recognize that the instruction states that a juror 
is not to give up a "conscientious conclusion" after reaching 
such a conclusion. However, the instruction given at the 
beginning of deliberations weighs too heavily in favor of 
telling a juror to yield his or her conviction to the 
majority early on. In short, the instruction reinforces the 
opinion of the majority more than is appropriate, at least in 
the beginning of deliberations. 
Perhaps it is justifiable to give a true Allen 
charge after a lengthy trial in which the jury, after full 
discussion of the evidence over a protracted period, is 
unable to agree. My fear is that this instruction may have 
the effect of causing jurors who are initially in a minority 
to yield their convictions before there is a full airing of 
the evidence and of each juror's views. 
I do not believe, however, that on the facts of this 
case, the instruction was prejudicial error. 
HALL, Chief Justice: (Dissenting) 
I do not join the court in reversing the conviction 
on the ground of conflict of interest in the absence of a 
showing that defendant was in any way prejudiced by reason of 
his representation by a part-time city attorney. Nothing in 
the record reveals that defendant was afforded anything less 
than the undivided loyalty and able assistance of counsel he 
was entitled to,1 and it is not for us to speculate 
otherwise. 
In addition, the prosecutorial duties of defense 
counsel were limited to violation of city ordinances,2 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1(4). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (amended in 1991 to permit 
prosecution of class A misdemeanors in the name of the State 
of Utah). 
whereas defendant was tried for a violation of state law. 
Hence, there was no conflict with defense counsel's duties as 
a city attorney. 
The distinct differences in the prosecutorial 
responsibilities of county and city attorneys explain the 
reason the statutory prohibition against county attorneys 
acting as defense counsel3 does not include city attorneys. 
In any event, in view of the evidence adduced at 
trial, it is unlikely that a new trial will produce a 
different result. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1(9)(a) (Supp. 1992) (formerly Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-18-2(10)(a)). 
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